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Nijmegen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
International biodiversity politics is traced from the Brundtland Report (1987) to
the Paris climate agreement of 2015. While continuously expanding in scope,
international biodiversity regulations are gradually losing substance and tend to
relinquish the self-determination rights of indigenous peoples with regard to
natural resources. The simultaneity of expansion and erosion is surprising in
view of the increased participation of indigenous spokespersons at international
meetings. These dynamics are explained by the introduction of intellectual
property rights for biological resources. The commodiﬁcation of life forms has
triggered an ongoing dynamic by which governments from industrialized and
developing countries, transnational corporations, and some NGOs push for the
legal codiﬁcation of neoliberal environmentalism. These ﬁndings suggest the
emergence of a new environmental constitutionalism, which subdues all
spheres of life to economic imperatives and simultaneously co-opts dissenting
voices to increase the stability of inherently exploitative structures.
KEYWORDS Biodiversity; traditional knowledge; intellectual property; indigenous rights; new
constitutionalism; regime complexes
Introduction
This article is about a dying star. While continuously expanding in scope,
international biodiversity regulations are gradually losing substance and
tend to relinquish the protection of indigenous rights. The ﬁrst compre-
hensive international treaty on genetic resources and traditional knowledge
(GR & TK), the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), attempted to reconcile
environmental, economic and indigenous rights goals in an all-
encompassing agreement (Redowell 1992). Over the years, the CBD has
become the focal point of an increasingly dense network of international
agreements that deal with GR & TK in a variety of speciﬁc contexts,
including pharmaceutical inventions, cosmetics, agricultural products, and
climate protection measures (Raustiala and Victor 2004, Wallbott 2014). At
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the same time, however, the self-determination rights of indigenous peoples
have been signiﬁcantly watered down. More recent agreements replace the
wording of ‘prior informed consent’ by the weaker formulation ‘indigenous
consultation’. This semantic shift appears quite surprising, because indi-
genous representatives frequently participate at international negotiations
(Reimerson 2013, Suiseeya 2014, Witter et al. 2015). Moreover, the change
in wording is highly problematic from a human rights perspective, because
it legitimizes the expropriation of indigenous groups in the name of scien-
tiﬁc progress and environmental protection (Drahos 2014).
Existing literature lacks the conceptual tools to explain the move from
consent to consultation. Previous writings have interpreted the interna-
tional institutionalization of GR & TK policies as an emerging ‘regime
complex’, ‘an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions
governing a particular issue-area’ (Raustiala and Victor 2004, p. 279–280,
see also Morin and Orsini 2014, Oberthür and Pożarowska 2013). Within
this framework, international biodiversity regulations are understood as the
outcome of negotiation dynamics between states, environmental NGOs,
and international organizations.
However, this perspective fails to acknowledge that the space of negoti-
able policies is pre-structured by the idea of commodifying natural assets,
which is at odds, or at least not entirely compatible, with the lifeworld
experiences of most indigenous actors. Taking their perspective into
account, Stephen Gill’s concept of a ‘new constitutionalism’ (Gill and
Cutler 2014) oﬀers a more comprehensive interpretive framework; not
only does it help to understand why non-market approaches are margin-
alized, but it also explains why indigenous viewpoints are swept aside
despite their participation at international negotiations.
Our empirical analysis is based on process-tracing. We draw on legisla-
tive documents, minutes of international meetings, media publications,
stakeholder statements, and policy briefs. All sources are analyzed with
regard to the role of indigenous actors during the course of international
negotiations. Additionally, we make use of 137 semi-structured interviews
conducted during the course of several interrelated research projects
between 2007 and 2018. We were able to talk with indigenous spokes-
persons, public oﬃcials, diplomats, and representatives from research insti-
tutions, corporations, and environmental NGOs in Berlin, Brasília, Brussels,
Geneva, Manaus, New Delhi, Ranchi, and Washington DC. While some
interviewees are directly quoted, most interviews are used as background
information for the documentation of our case. Given the sensitivity of
indigenous politics, we ensure the conﬁdentiality of our interview partners
by not revealing their names or any other information that may endanger
their anonymity.
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In the next section, we explain why we consider the prevailing biodi-
versity regime complex literature to be insuﬃcient and why it needs to be
amended by insights from writings on the new constitutionalism. We then
explain the underlying tensions between indigenous perspectives on GR &
TK and the commodiﬁcation of their resources preferred by external actors.
This lays the groundwork for our reconstruction of the history of interna-
tional biodiversity negotiations from a low angle shot, i.e. with a focus on
the non-fulﬁlment of indigenous demands. In the ﬁnal section, we present
our case as an example of the new environmental constitutionalism. We
conclude with an outlook on possible future developments and some
propositions for further research.
Overcoming the blind spots in the regime complex literature
Over the last twenty years, international biodiversity politics have enjoyed
considerable academic attention. Moreover, empirical analyses have
inspired the development of new conceptual tools to understand interna-
tional environmental politics. Referring to Stephen Krasner’s notion of
regimes ‘as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area’ (Krasner
1983 [1982], p. 1), Raustiala and Victor drew on international biodiversity
politics to show that environmental policy coordination is simultaneously
taking place in various negotiation forums. Moreover, they hinted at the
idea that the outcome of international negotiations is not only shaped by
states’ interests but also inﬂuenced by the institutional setting of the
negotiations (Raustiala and Victor 2004).
Referring to the same empirical example, other authors spelled out the
motivations, tactics, and interactions of international organizations’
secretariats, which were increasingly perceived as actors in their own
right (Gehring and Oberthür 2009, Oberthür and Pożarowska 2013).
They demonstrated that the multiplication of negotiation forums in
regime complexes does not outweigh but at least relativizes the impact
of powerful states’ interests and strategies, because it creates a pull factor
for cooperation (Morin and Orsini 2011, 2014). Moreover, they showed
that the interlinkage of various negotiation platforms creates
a deliberative space in which other non-state actors such as environmen-
tal NGOs and experts can make their voices heard (Orsini et al. 2013,
Kuyper 2014). In the more recent literature, the question of horizontal
coherence between various international organizations’ biodiversity reg-
ulations is increasingly linked to the question of vertical coherence, i.e.
the congruence between internationally agreed rule-making and domestic
preference formation and policy implementation patterns.
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It would do injustice to the biodiversity regime complexity literature to
claim that its authors are uncritical of the results of internationally institu-
tionalized coordination. At least in some articles, the underrepresentation
of economically and politically weaker actors is problematized, and many
authors are well aware of a potentially loose coupling between international
agreements and domestic policies (Oberthür/Rabitz 2014, Rabitz 2018).
However, the coordinating function of international agreements remains
the main vantage point in this literature. Its authors tend to downplay those
claims that have remained unrecognized or have not even been brought to
the table. Moreover, scholars seem to equate marginalized actors’ enlarged
opportunities to participate at international negotiations with the chance to
have a substantial inﬂuence on their outcomes (Morin et al. 2017).
Especially in view of the last point, we think that the regime complexity
literature cannot fully explain the paradox of our research question.
We therefore suggest that to understand the biodiversity regime complex
requires a critical political economy perspective. In our view, Stephen Gill’s
concept of new constitutionalism may serve as an alternative interpretive
framework, which should not replace but amend the existing literature. Like
the regime complexity literature, Gill starts from the observation of
a densiﬁcation of international rule-making, which can be associated with
cooperation within and among various international organizations (Gill
1998). Gill and other critical scholars understand the ongoing process of
legal codiﬁcation as an attempt of powerful corporate actors and states to
cement a neoliberal world order by internationally binding treaties (Gill
1995, Cutler 2014). Secure property rights play an important role in this
process, because they make resources tradeable and facilitate the invest-
ments of ﬁnancially strong actors.
At the same time, de-commodifying (e.g. welfare) policies are dis-
mantled, and all citizens are increasingly subjected to the pressures of
market forces. Any resistance against the move towards ‘disciplinary capit-
alism’ is weakened by the individualization and denial of collective (group
or class-based) interests (Gill 2002; Cerny 2010). Potentially critical actors
are allowed to formally participate at discussion rounds, but their inﬂuence
is limited to technical improvements of the pre-deﬁned policy course (Gill
1995). While their co-optation is used to legitimate decision-making pro-
cesses, any substantial resistance is supressed by authoritarian means if
needed (Wigger and Buch-Hansen 2014). However, the new constitution-
alism remains open for contestation because of its inherent contradictions
(Gill and Cutler 2014).
As of yet, the literature on the new constitutionalism has only occasion-
ally been applied to environmental politics. Gill himself remains rather
superﬁcial in this regard, simply stating that capitalism is unable to cope
with natural crises (Gill 2012). We nevertheless think that his basic
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framework can be applied to our case, if it is amended by the idea that
environmental policies do not necessarily exclude but rather go hand in
hand with market-based ideologies and instruments (Zelli et al. 2013). To
make our argument comprehensible, however, we ﬁrst have to explain the
tension between indigenous actors’ preferences and the commodiﬁcation of
their resources.
Little words that count
Indigenous communities throughout the world have acquired an intimate
knowledge of local ﬂora and fauna. Plants and animals are used for nutri-
tional and medicinal purposes, but they are also at the roots of indigenous
mythologies, cultural practices, and belief systems (Dutﬁeld 2014). Usually,
GR & TK are subject to speciﬁc customary laws (Francis 2009). Many
healers in Tamil Nadu (India), for example, believe that any commercial
exploitation of their knowledge will corrupt the pharmacological eﬀects of
the used substances, and the Terena people (Brazil) consider the whole
community as the owner of GR & TK, even if the knowledge is exclusively
held by their shamans (Interview 187). While many authors assume that
customary rules ensure the sustainable use of natural resources (e.g.
Nagendra and Ostrom 2012), indigenous communities themselves perceive
these rules as a cornerstone of their cultural identity (Tobin and Swiderska
2001). That does not necessarily mean that they would deny the access to
GR & TK, but they insist on their right to decide by themselves and by their
own rules if, and under which conditions, they share their knowledge with
outsiders (Drahos 2014).
In international law, indigenous self-determination is generally sub-
sumed under the concept of (free) prior informed consent (PIC). Graham
Dutﬁeld, one of the leading ethnologists in this ﬁeld, deﬁnes PIC as follows:
Prior informed consent is consent to an activity that is given after receiving
full disclosure for the activity, the speciﬁc procedures the activity would
entail, the potential risks involved, and the full implications that can realis-
tically be foreseen. Prior informed consent implies the right to stop the
activity from proceeding and for it to be halted if it is already underway.
(Dutﬁeld 2009, p. 60).
Most scholars agree that PIC not only aﬀects the substance of a decision,
but also refers to a procedural dimension (Buxton 2010). It implies bottom-
up procedures, by which customary decision-making processes must not be
disturbed by external threats or coercion (Dutﬁeld 2014). But self-
determination rights for indigenous peoples also impinge on the principle
of state sovereignty, which is particularly emphasized by governments in
the postcolonial world. Although PIC does not entail the right to secession,
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it reduces governmental prerogatives to regulate property rights. Such
restrictions are anything but unique. It has been argued that any self-
commitment vis-à-vis foreign states, transnational ﬁrms, and international
organizations can be interpreted as an expression of a state’s ‘external
sovereignty’, by which governments voluntarily relinquish some of their
competencies for the sake of economic advantages (Krasner 2001).
However, PIC stipulates ‘legal pluralism’ on the domestic level, because it
obliges governments to incorporate the customary rules of indigenous
citizens within the law of the state (Teubner and Korth 2009). In the
words of David Lake (2003), it restrains ‘internal state sovereignty’.
At the same time, PIC signiﬁcantly enhances the bargaining position of
indigenous communities vis-à-vis other non-governmental actors.
Although not explicitly stated, it grants them a collective property title
over their community’s resources, whose distribution is internally deﬁned
(Buxton 2010). Once again, this is hardly a unique institution. Intellectual
property law, for example, allows companies to claim property rights for the
inventions of their employees (May and Sell 2006). If collective ownership
titles are applied to indigenous communities, however, they compel exter-
nal actors to accept a denial of disclosure. It is against this background that
many external actors (e.g. scientists, environmentalists) are concerned
about the unpredictable consequences for negotiations unfolding under
the PIC principle.
In international negotiations, many actors prefer weaker formulations
such as ‘prior informed consultation’ or even ‘approval and involvement’
(CBD, art. 8j). These terms are hardly deﬁned. The U.N. REDD (Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) program operationa-
lizes ‘consultation’ as a ‘two-way ﬂow of information and the exchange of
views. This involves sharing information, garnering feedback and reactions
and, in more formal consultation processes, responding to stakeholders how
their recommendations were addressed (including if they were not, why not)’
(UN-REDD 2013, p. 41). While this formulation also envisages the participa-
tion of indigenous groups, it does not compel external actors ‘to listen and to
accept “no” as an answer’ (Hanna and Vanclay 2013, p. 154).
In the language of game theory, the diﬀerence between consent and
consultation is similar to the distinction between voluntary and compulsory
negotiation systems (Scharpf 1993), at least from the perspective of indigen-
ous peoples. The principle of consent endows them with the same veto power
as external actors, who may always decide to withdraw from a project. Mere
consultation rights, on the other hand, lead to a highly asymmetric game, in
which only external actors are vested with exit (veto) powers, whereas
indigenous communities are eventually compelled to accept an agreement.
Referring to Adam Smith’s famous metaphor of the market mechanism, this
ultimately leads to a situation in which the baker may still try to negotiate an
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acceptable price but is ultimately forced to sell his pastries. Apart from this
economistic interpretation, many authors claim that the veto power of
indigenous actors motivates external actors to engage in more in-depth
discussion with indigenous groups, in which bargaining tactics may be
replaced by ‘discursive democracy’ (Buxton 2010).
Admittedly, both ‘prior informed consent’ and ‘consultation’ are only
vaguely deﬁned terms that do not qualify as an erga omnes (universally
applicable) obligation in international law. Moreover, participatory proce-
dures inevitably raise many technical issues that cannot easily be resolved
(Dutﬁeld 2009). However, consent and consultation represent two clearly
distinguishable ‘regulatory principles’ (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000,
p. 18–19), which imply diﬀerent patterns of interaction between indigenous
communities and external actors (Haugen 2016). As we will show, negotia-
tors from all sides are very well aware of these subtle but important diﬀer-
ences and attempt to craft wording in line with their own interests.
Expansion and erosion: the evolution of international
biodiversity politics
Here, we trace international negotiations on TK & GR over the last 30 years
with a focus on indigenous rights. We start with an analysis of the dynamics
of the early 1990s, which led to the adoption of the Convention on
Biodiversity and the subsequent application of its basic concepts in other
international agreements. We then describe the consolidation of international
regulations in the 2000s, which entailed an at least facultative recognition of
indigenous rights. Finally, we show that the international legal framework as
well as its interplay with regional and national regulations are currently
rapidly expanding, but tend to weaken indigenous self-determination rights.
Deﬁning the stakes: biodiversity regulations in the 1980s and 1990s
Already in the colonial era, European natural scientists were fascinated by
the abundance of biodiversity in the newly conquered territories. With the
voluntary or forced help of indigenous communities, they ‘discovered’
numerous species in the New World and established scientiﬁcally renowned
collections in their motherlands (Lowenhaupt Tsing 2005). After the second
world war, their moral and legal impunity was conﬁrmed by the ‘common
heritage of mankind’ doctrine, which pictured GR & TK as a public good
free to be accessed without further obligations (Shiva 2001, p. 49–50).
This perspective was challenged in the 1980s when the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that genetically engineered micro-organisms would be eligible
for patent protection (Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303).
Governments in developing countries ﬁrst sought to prevent the application
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of intellectual property rights to their resources. During the negotiations of
the Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, they defended the common
heritage doctrine (Fowler 1994). Increasingly, however, they realized the
economic potential of biodiversity and demanded ﬁnancial compensation
for the use the ‘green gold’ of their hinterlands (Raustiala and Victor 2004,
p. 289).
At the beginning of the 1990s, the alliance of countries from the global
South gained the support of transnational environmental groups and inter-
national organizations (Görg 2003). The secretariat of the U.N.
Commission on Environment and Development pressed strongly for
a globally binding agreement (Bernstein 2000). It enjoyed the technical,
personal, and ﬁnancial support of the Business Council for Sustainable
Development, which was intensively involved with pre-negotiations for
the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (Doran 1993). Indigenous com-
munities, on the other hand, were not admitted to participate directly at
either the preparatory meetings or the concluding summit (Wold 1993).
Eventually, industrialized countries conceded that the exchange of GR &
TK should be subject to an international agreement, although in a rather
narrow and unspeciﬁc sense. In the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD),
provider and user states agreed on the principle that biological resources
fall under the sovereign rights of the states of origin (Götting 2004). Any
extraction becomes subject to ‘fair and equitable access and beneﬁt sharing’
and grants indigenous communities the right of ‘approval and involvement’
(CBD, Art. 8j). However, the convention only refers to ‘consent’ with
regard to the competences of national authorities (CBD, Art. 15.5).
Within academic debates, the CBD was quickly described as an innova-
tive international regime (Spector et al. 1994). Spurred by the activities of
environmental groups and the ‘biodiplomacy’ of developing countries, its
principles spilled over to negotiations within adjacent ﬁelds (Dutﬁeld 2001).
Most notably, negotiations on seed varieties gained new momentum
(Rosendal 2006). After protracted negotiations in the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Treaty on Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture explicitly subjected biological
materials to the sovereignty of states (Cooper 2002). Indigenous customary
rights, however, are only indirectly addressed in the ITPGRFA (see Art.
9.2c), and the wording avoids any intertextual interference with their rights
as described in the CBD.
The lengthy negotiation phase for the ITPGRFA from the late 1980s
until the early 2000s already indicated industrialized countries’ reluctance
to subscribe to potentially costly commitments. The U.S., for example,
signed both the CBD and the ITPGRFA but has never become a party to
either treaty. This reﬂects the concerns of major U.S. biotechnology ﬁrms,
which were afraid of additional costs for their bio-explorations in the
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Global South (Carr 2008). At the same time, the corporate sector fought for
stricter protection of its own innovations. Lobbied by a broad range of
industries, the U.S. Trade Representative pushed for the global adoption of
rigorous intellectual property standards to prevent ‘piracy’ in the develop-
ing world. U.S. companies convinced their European counterparts to sup-
port this (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002, p. 121–126).
Together, the U.S. and the European Union bypassed the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which had been traditionally
concerned with the negotiations on protective measures for intangible goods
(Sell 2010). Instead, the largest trade powers of the 1990s added intellectual
property issues to the negotiation package of the GATT Uruguay round,
which ultimately led to the foundation of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1994. When the U.S. and the EU promised facilitated access to
their agricultural and textile markets (Cottier and Panizzon 2004), developing
countries ultimately subscribed to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994. The agreement
signiﬁcantly limits their possibilities for reproducing inventions from indus-
trialized countries. TRIPS does not explicitly refer to GR & TK. Industrial
inventions which make use of indigenous knowledge are eligible for patent-
ability, but GR & TK as such do not enjoy any intellectual property protection
at all. Indigenous rights such as PIC are not even mentioned.
By the same logic, the amendment of the Union for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) in 1991 strengthens the rights of plant
breeders to protect newly developed plant varieties, but excludes incre-
mental seed improvements by small farmers (Dutﬁeld 2004). While
developing countries formally remained free not to ratify the UPOV
amendment, they were strongly pressured to do so (Chauhan et al.
1997, p. 59–61). But even without direct coercion, many leading agro-
nomists in the global South assumed that the introduction of property
rights would be necessary to preserve their countries’ biodiversity
(Swaminathan 1997). This interpretation, however, went against the
claims of indigenous peoples. Their representatives addressed the U.N.
Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities to demand more self-determination rights with regard to their
resources (Engle 2010, p. 67–68).
Balancing property and Indigenous rights in the 2000s
Since its commencement, governments in developing countries criticized
the perceived unfairness of the TRIPS agreement. Their complaints were
echoed by prominent activists such as Vandana Shiva, who contrasted the
TRIPS obligations to refrain from any imitation of industrialized countries’
‘inventions’ to the allegedly rampant theft of GR & TK (‘biopiracy’) in
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developing countries (Shiva 2001). Many civil society groups, e.g. the Rural
Advancement Foundation International, supported this criticism. While
their protests strengthened the claims of developing countries’ govern-
ments, it appears questionable whether they really met the demands of
the aﬀected indigenous communities. At least implicitly, the framing of
biopiracy as ‘theft’ helped to proliferate the view that GR & TK should be
perceived as tradable commodities.
Nevertheless, the global discourse on GR&TK stimulated substantial
reforms on the regional level. The African Union, for example, adopted
the African Model Law (2000) on the Protection of the Rights of Local
Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to
Biological Resources. The African Model Law attempts to reconcile ‘the
prior informed consent of the State and the concerned local communities’
(Part I, section c). While this formulation seems to give more rights to
indigenous knowledge holders than the CBD, the subsequent objectives
only speak about their ‘eﬀective participation’ (Part I, section e) and
explicitly ‘promote the conservation, evaluation and sustainable utilisation
of biological resources’ (Part I, section h). When deﬁning PIC (Part II), the
African Model Law appears less state-centred than the CBD, but still
connects the consent of indigenous groups and state authorities without
anticipating conﬂicting views.
Meanwhile, the WIPO perceived the debates on biodiversity as an
opportunity to put itself back into play. It initiated several fact-ﬁnding
missions in cooperation with the CBD secretariat (Straus and Klunker
2007). The activities of the WIPO secretariat coincided with increased
attention by developing and emerging countries to the potential role of
this forum. Led by Brazil, a broad alliance of provider states strongly
advocated amendment of the TRIPS agreement (May 2006), claiming that
the use of GR & TK should be documented in patent applications. Even
some leading trade economists argued that a ‘disclosure requirement’ would
make it possible to trace the use of these resources by the life science
industry in industrialized countries and thereby serve as an enforcement
mechanism for the access and beneﬁt sharing provisions of the CBD
(Cottier and Panizzon 2004).
Since 2002, the disclosure requirement also enjoyed the oﬃcial support
of the CBD, which explicitly referred to it in the ‘Bonn Guidelines’ (Helfer
2004). Some industrialized countries such as Switzerland showed their
willingness to accept a TRIPS amendment, because they expected that this
position would help to promote their corporations’ position in developing
countries (Hufty et al. 2014). However, the majority of OECD countries,
spearheaded by the U.S., passionately rejected any legal change. They even
denied the CBD observer status in the WTO in order to forestall any
substantial debate (Interview 044).
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In view of the political stalemate, the WIPO decided to focus on tech-
nical questions. It initiated a reform of the international patent classiﬁca-
tion system, which made it possible for patent oﬃces to recognize
documented GR & TK during the examination of patent applications
(Dutﬁeld 2001, p. 268–269). Provider countries such as India actively
supported this reform, because it facilitated the economic exploitation of
indigenous resources. But even industrialized countries felt pressurized to
contribute, because they were aware that a reputation as ‘bio-pirate’ would
endanger the position of their corporations in the provider states of GR &
TK (Carr 2008). Most notably, the U.S. concluded an agreement with
Indian authorities to consider the Indian Traditional Knowledge Digital
Library (TKDL) as a source for patent examinations (Narula 2014).
At least for a while, WIPO oﬃcials tried to directly involve indigenous
actors (Interview 111). In 2005, they proactively supported and co-ﬁnanced
the establishment of a voluntary fund to make it possible for indigenous
representatives to participate in the deliberations of the Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources (IP Watch 2013).
The reactions of governments from developing countries, however, remained
lukewarm at best. Indian diplomats, in particular, made it clear that separate
representation of indigenous interests would only detract from the over-
arching purpose to secure property rights for GR & TK (Interview 115).
WIPO diplomats began to regret the facilitation of indigenous representa-
tives, because they realized that their demands for self-determination pro-
voked ﬁerce resistance from industrialized and developing countries’
governments alike (Interviews 115). For this reason, the organization even
tried to prevent the publication of one of its own reports (Tobin 2014,
p. 167).
But indigenous spokespersons also quickly recognized that their partici-
pation at the WIPO discussion rounds obscured the lack of meaningful
involvement (Interview 202). Due to this, they drew on their comparably
stronger position within the U.N. human rights system (Helfer 2003).
Towards the end of the ‘International Decade of the World’s Indigenous
People’ (1995–2004), they had succeeded in getting a relatively strong voice
in the international human rights arena (Feiring 2013, p. 27–30). After
passionate disputes, the ﬁnal version of the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples explicitly mentions the concept of (free) prior informed
consent and confers on indigenous communities ‘the right to maintain,
control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge
and traditional cultural expressions’ (Art. 31.1).
While the U.N. declaration is not legally binding, it served as a major
point of reference during debates in the CBD during the late 2000s.
Increasingly, indigenous actors were able to participate at the side events
of the conferences of parties of the CBD (Teran 2016). Diplomats from
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developing countries had mixed feelings about their interventions
(Interview 187). On the one hand, they understood the participation of
indigenous as an opportunity to increase pressure on industrialized coun-
tries and life science industries (Interview 185). On the other hand, indi-
genous demands for the international adoption of indigenous PIC were
perceived as a threat to sovereign prerogatives. It is against this background
that Brazilian diplomats explicitly supported the participation of indigenous
representatives but made clear that they were not entitled to speak on
behalf of the Brazilian government (De Chastonay 2018: 104–125).
Finally, the donor countries of GR & TK succeeded in convincing
industrialized countries that the CBD must be amended. In the Nagoya
Protocol, the latter promised to establish checkpoints in order to ensure
that companies and public research institutes comply with access and
beneﬁt-sharing mechanisms of the donor countries (Rosendal and
Andresen 2014, Oberthür and Pożarowska 2013, p. 108–109). With regard
to indigenous rights, however, the Nagoya Protocol remains quite ambiva-
lent. On the one hand, it strengthens the legal position of indigenous and
local communities by directly referring to the U.N. Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Suiseeya 2014, p. 103), explicitly addressing
their importance as ‘knowledge holders’ and stipulating that any access to
their resources shall be subjected to their PIC. On the other hand, the
corresponding regulations remain subject to national law (Nagoya Protocol,
Art. 6.3f), which eventually gives governments the right to determine the
extent of indigenous self-determination.
From consent to consultation: biodiversity regulations since the 2010s
With some notable exceptions (U.S.A., Brazil), the Nagoya Protocol was
quickly ratiﬁed by many industrialized and developing countries.
Indigenous commentators became aware that their situation was dramati-
cally changing. Ana María Guacho, a spokesperson of Ecuadorian indigen-
ous groups, summarized her interpretation as follows:
Since ancestral times, Mother Earth has been cared for, protected, and
respected by Indigenous Peoples as a living being and life giver. (…) We
never put a price on a plant. (…) This contemporary world is going against
the natural laws that our ancestors transmitted to us orally from one gen-
eration to the next. I do believe that the Nagoya Protocol is going to change
our life. We will be forced to think and act in a new way. (A. M. Guacho,
quoted in Teran 2016, p. 14–15).
Not only indigenous actors made up their mind. The EU quickly adopted
the Nagoya Protocol, but avoided any connection with intellectual property
laws. Although a resolution of the European Parliament initially suggested
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the adoption of developing countries’ demands for a disclosure requirement
[2012/2135(INI)], the proposed linkage between safeguards for indigenous
PIC and European intellectual property law was denied by the Council and
the European Commission. Neither institution was willing to endanger the
interests of the European pharmaceutical industry, which claimed that the
disclosure requirement would create legal uncertainty and lower their
competitiveness vis-à-vis multinational corporations from the U.S.A.
(Interview 420).
The lack of an internationally viable enforcement mechanism for indi-
genous rights also puts the provider states of GR & TK under competitive
pressure. If they implement PIC provisions in their domestic legislation,
they can reasonably expect that transnational life science industries will
relocate their research to other countries in which bio-explorations are not
complicated by the protection of indigenous rights (Interview 433). Against
this background, emerging countries such as Brazil have initiated reforms
to replace the formerly mandatory consent of indigenous communities by
sweeping consultation rights (Eimer and Donadelli 2016), while other
countries (e.g. India) rigorously promote the interests of their own life
science industries and even make it impossible for indigenous (Adivasi)
activists to protest on the international level (wiretapping, denial of pass-
ports). For similar reasons, the already vague recognition of indigenous
self-determination in the African Model Law suﬀers from a lack of imple-
mentation and is hardly applied in practice.
At the same time, biodiversity regulations are rapidly spilling over to
other issue-areas. GR & TK have become increasingly important in the
context of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
(REDD) initiatives (Thompson et al. 2011). In essence, REDD+ initiatives
are based on the sustainable use of natural resources in the Global South in
exchange for ﬁnancial compensation from carbon dioxide emitting compa-
nies. The exploration of GR & TK is needed to deﬁne appropriate refor-
estation plans (Feldt 2009). Quite often, however, local project developers
ignore indigenous customary rules (Ciplet 2014) and even approve enforced
displacement of indigenous groups as soon as they have transmitted the
necessary background knowledge for REDD+ projects (Interview 450).
On the international level, indigenous representatives keep protesting
against the negative consequences of internationally hailed climate protec-
tion policies. Initially, they focused on the World Bank, one of the largest
ﬁnanciers of REDD+ initiatives. At the time, the World Bank appeared very
committed to taking indigenous voices into account (Interview 453). Due to
ﬁerce objections from many national governments (World Bank 2016),
however, the organization stepped back and explicitly stated that it con-
sidered the consent of indigenous communities to be given ‘even if some
individuals or groups object’ (World Bank 2017, p. 80). Reacting to the new
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guidelines, indigenous actors complained about the ‘direct aﬀront to the
hundreds of indigenous representatives who travelled to their capital cities,
to regional consultations and to Washington DC to share experiences and
provide recommendations’ (Forest Peoples Program 2016).
Similar dynamics can be observed in the context of the negotiations of
the UNFCCC (U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change). Here
again, REDD+ initiatives enjoy the broad support of the involved interna-
tional organizations, environmental NGOs, transnational companies and
governments, despite all REDD+’s well-known shortcomings. Indigenous
representatives are regularly invited to participate at the talks, but they are
only listened to if they subscribe to the prevailing discourse (Enns et al.
2014, Wallbott 2014).
The dilemmas and pitfalls of indigenous participation also became
visible during the negotiations of the Paris climate agreement. Once
again, indigenous groups perceived the summit as an occasion to bring
in their perspectives. They considered their participation to be particu-
larly relevant because of their special vulnerability to the consequences
of climate change. In fact, 51 indigenous representatives were formally
invited to participate in order to show the urgency of an international
agreement (UNFCCC 2014). In view of their own demands, however,
indigenous participation was hardly successful. The Paris agreement
explicitly mentions traditional knowledge as an important factor to
combat climate change, but the vast majority of the diplomats both
from industrialized and developing countries rejected any direct refer-
ence to indigenous rights (Hansen 2015, Komai 2015, Kumar-Rao 2016).
Instead of prior informed consent, the Paris agreement merely stipulates
that indigenous concerns should be ‘taken into consideration’ (Paris
agreement, Art. 7.5).
In an oﬃcial statement, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Indigenous
Rights oﬃcially criticized the weak human rights language of the Paris
agreement (Survival International 2015). To express their deep disap-
pointment, indigenous representatives made use of the oﬃcial announce-
ment of the conclusion of the Paris agreement to claim that the world’s
most ambitious attempt to combat climate change would entail genoci-
dal consequences (Friends of the Earth 2015). Their sharp criticism,
however, remained largely ignored by the broader public audience,
which hailed the agreement as a milestone for international climate
protection. For the moment, it seems that international climate policies
will further weaken indigenous rights in the biodiversity regime com-
plex. However, the ongoing revolts of indigenous groups against
enforced reforestation projects (Nel 2017) also make clear that the
contestations are far from over.
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Conclusion: indigenous rights and the new environmental
constitutionalism
Here, we have explained the evolution of a dying star – why international
biodiversity regulations are expanding in scope while losing their indigen-
ous rights substance. Empirically, our analysis shows that the simultaneity
of expansion and erosion can be explained by the introduction of intellec-
tual property rights for biological resources. The commodiﬁcation of life
forms has triggered an ongoing dynamic by which governments from both
industrialized and developing countries, corporate actors, and even some
environmental NGOs push for an expansion of market logic to ever new
ﬁelds. To legitimize their ambitions, dominant actors instrumentalize the
participation of indigenous representatives at international negotiations but
deny or even repress their demands for self-determination as soon as this
might endanger the fragile compromise between environmental goals and
economic interests.
In our reconstruction, we have deliberately focused on the rights of
indigenous peoples. The low angle view admittedly eclipses those achieve-
ments which are usually highlighted by the biodiversity regime complex
literature. We agree that the institutionalization of international biodiver-
sity politics has helped to reconcile environmental and economic priorities
while also providing a compromise between the ﬁnancial interests of GR &
TK user and provider countries. In our view, the regime complexity litera-
ture provides a framework very well-suited to understand the negotiation
dynamics related above. However, we also warn that the emphasis on
property rights in the expanding biodiversity regime complex tends to
sacriﬁce internationally recognized indigenous rights on the altar of the
new environmental constitutionalism. As long as indigenous actors’ criti-
cisms of market mechanisms are not taken seriously, their participation will
not increase, but will eventually undermine the legitimacy of international
rule-making.
Yet the current state of aﬀairs is not the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama
1989). It is still possible that industrialized countries will give up their
resistance to the disclosure requirement in intellectual property law and
that stakeholders from both the Global North and South will acknowledge
their shared responsibility for recognition of indigenous rights in reforesta-
tion projects. To use the vocabulary of regime complexity authors, this
would not only strengthen horizontal coherence (between intellectual prop-
erty, environmental, and human rights agreements) but also reduce com-
petitive pressures among the donor countries of GR & TK and thereby
facilitate the vertical coherence of the biodiversity regime complex.
To be clear, such a decision might reduce the proﬁtability of industrialized
countries’ life science industries, impede some reforestation projects, and
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challenge developing countries’ ambitions to strengthen their internal sover-
eignty vis-à-vis indigenous actors. However, it would help to (re-)connect the
environmental and economic goals of the biodiversity regime complex with
its human rights dimension. For better or worse, the dying star of interna-
tional biodiversity regulations might open the space for a new galaxy.
Acknowledgments
A ﬁrst version of this work was presented at the Politcologenetmaal (June 1–2, 2017, in
Leiden, The Netherlands). We are grateful for the comments of Matthias Kranke, Tom
van der Meer, Luuk Schmitz, Angela Wigger and Marcel Wissenburg. This work was
supported by the Fritz-Thyssen Foundation under Grant Az. 50.15.0.023PO, July-
August 2015, and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under Grant Project D 7,
SFB 700 Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, 2010–2014.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
List of Interviews
Interview 044. Brazilian diplomat, July 31, 2007, Geneva.
Interview 092. Peruvian indigenous spokesperson, July 15, 2010, Geneva.
Interview 111. WIPO oﬃcial, September 15, 2010, Geneva.
Interview 113. Representative of a Swiss human rights NGO, September 9, 2010,
Zurich.
Interview 115. UNCTAD oﬃcial, September 16, 2010, Geneva.
Interview 185. Spokesperson of a Brazilian traditional community, August 3, 2011,
Brasília.
Interview 187. Brazilian Ministry of foreign aﬀairs oﬃcial, August, 4, 2011, Skype
Interview.
Interview 202. Brazilian indigenous spokesperson, August 17, 2011, Brasília
Interview 304: Indian Adivasi healer, February 19, 2010, village in Jharkhand (India)
Interview 408: Brazilian indigenous spokesperson, August 30, 2012, São Paulo
Interview 420. Representative of the German Association of Research-based
Pharmaceutical Industry, September 14, 2012, Berlin
Interview 431: Representative of a Brazilian NGO, July 23, 2015, Brasília
Interview 433. Representative of a Brazilian pharmaceutical company, July 28, 2015,
Brasília
Interview 434: Brazilian prosecutor, July 28, 2015, Brasília
Interview 450. Spokesperson of the Brazilian rubber tappers’ movement, August 12,
2015, Manaus
Interview 453. Representative of a German indigenous rights NGO, July 10, 2017,
Cologne
16 T. R. EIMER AND T. BARTELS
References
2012/2135(INI). Draft report on development aspects of intellectual property rights
on genetic resources: the impact on poverty reduction in developing countries.
Available from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/
deve/pr/910/910292/910292en.pdf [accessed 08 January 2019]
African Model Law, 2000. African model law on the protection of the rights of local
communities, farmers and breeders, and for the regulation of access to biological
resources. Available from https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/oau/
oau001en.pdf [accessed 07 January 2019].
Bernstein, S., 2000. Ideas, social structure and the compromise of liberal
environmentalism. European Journal of International Relations, 6 (4), 464–612.
Guidelines, B. (2002). doi:10.1177/1354066100006004002.
Braithwaite, J. and Drahos, P., 2000. Global business regulation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Buxton, A., 2010. Democratic pragmatism or green radicalism? A critical review of the
relationship between free, prior and informed consent and policymaking formining.
Development DESTIN Studies Institute, Working Paper No.10-102. Retreived from:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP102.pdf
Carr, J., 2008. Agreements that divide: TRIPS vs. CBD and proposals for mandatory
disclosure of source and origin of genetic resources in patent applications.
Journal of Transnational Law and Policy, 18, 131–154.
Cerny, P.G., 2010. The competition state today: from raison d’État to raison du
Monde. Policy Studies, 31 (1), 5–21. doi:10.1080/01442870903052801.
Chauhan, K., Sarat Babu, G., and Arora, S., 1997. Rights of local communties and
implications of the convention on biological diversity. In: B. Sing andM. Neeti, eds..
Intellectual property rights and the tribals. New Delhi: Inter-India Publications, 57–
66.
Ciplet, D., 2014. Contesting climate injustice: transnational advocacy network
struggles for rights in UN climate politics. Global Environmental Politics, 14
(4), 75–97. doi:10.1162/GLEP_a_00258.
Cooper, H.D., 2002. The international treaty on plant genetic resources for food
and agriculture. Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental
Law, 11 (1), 1–16. doi:10.1111/1467-9388.00298.
Cottier, T. and Panizzon, M., 2004. Legal perspectivees on traditional knowledg: the
case for intellectual property protection. Journal of International Economic Law,
7 (2), 371–400. doi:10.1093/jiel/7.2.371.
Cutler, C., 2014. New constitutionalism and the commodity form of global capit-
alism. In: S. Gill and C. Cutler, eds.. New constitutionalism and world order.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 46–62.
Doran, P., 1993. “The earth summit” (UNCED) ecology as spectacle. Global Society:
Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations, 7 (1), 55–65.
Drahos, P., 2014. Intellectual property, indigenous people and their knowledge.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Drahos, P. and Braithwaite, J., 2002. Information feudalism. London: Earthscan.
Dutﬁeld, G., 2001. TRIPS-related aspects of traditional knowledge. Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law, 33, 233–275.
Dutﬁeld, G., 2004. Intellectual property, biogenetic resources and traditional knowl-
edge. London: Earthscan.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 17
Dutﬁeld, G., 2009. Protecting the rights of indigenous peoples: can prior informed
consent help?. In: R. Wynberg, D. Schroeder, and R. Chennels, eds.. Indigenous
peoples, consent and beneﬁt sharing. Dordrecht: Springer, 53–67.
Dutﬁeld, G., 2014. Traditional knowledge, intellectual property and pharmaceutical
innovation: what’s left to discuss? Available from https://www.researchgate.net/
proﬁle/Graham_Dutﬁeld/publication/272173867_Traditional_Knowledge_
Intellectual_Property_and_Pharmaceutical_Innovation_Whats_Left_to_Discuss_
David__Halbert_eds_THE_SAGE_HANDBOOK_OF_INTELLECTUAL_
PROPERTY._Sage_2014/links/54ddda660cf2814662eb91c3.pdf [accessed 09
November 2018].
Eimer, T.R. and Donadelli, F., 2016. Paradoxes of ratiﬁcation: the impact of the
Nagoya Protocol on Brazilian biodiversity policies. Paper presented at the Sixth
Biennial Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on Regulatory Governance,
July 6–8, Tilburg (The Netherlands).
Engle, K., 2010. The elusive promise of indigenous development. Durham: Duke
University Press.
Enns, C., Bersaglio, B., and Kepe, T., 2014. Indigenous voices and the making of the
post-2015 development agenda: the recurring tyranny of participation. Third
World Quarterly, 35 (3), 358–375. doi:10.1080/01436597.2014.893482.
Feiring, B., 2013. Indigenous Peoples’ rights to lands, territories, and resources. Rome:
International Land Coalition.
Feldt, H., 2009. Stärkung indigener Organisationen in Lateinamerika. Indigene
Völker und Klimapolitik. In GIZ (Ed.). Eschborn.
Forest Peoples Program, 2016, World Bank undermines decades of progress on build-
ing protections for the rights of indigenous peoples. Available from: http://www.
forestpeoples.org/en/topics/world-bank/news/2016/07/world-bank-undermines-
decades-progress-building-protections-rights-in [accessed on 5 July 2017].
Fowler, C., 1994. Unnatural selection. Technology, politics, and plant evolution.
Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach.
Francis, S., 2009. Who speaks for the tribe? The Arogyapacha case in Kerala. In:
S. Haunss and K. Shadlen, eds. Politics of intellectual property. Contestation over
the ownership, use, and control of knowledge and information. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, 80–106.
Friends of the Earth, 2015. UN promoting potentially genocidal policy at world
climate summit. Available from: http://www.foei.org/press/archive-by-subject/for
ests-and-biodiversity-press/un-promoting-potentially-genocidal-policy-world-
climate-summit [accessed on 3 July 2016].
Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? The National Interest, (16), 3–18.
Gehring, T. and Oberthür, S., 2009. The causal mechanisms of interaction between
international institutions. European Journal of International Relations, 15 (1),
125–156. doi:10.1177/1354066108100055.
Gill, S., 1995. Globalisation, market civilisation, and disciplinary neoliberalism.
Millennium, 24 (3), 399–423. doi:10.1177/03058298950240030801.
Gill, S., 1998. New constitutionalism, democratisation and global political economy.
Global Change, Peace & Security, 10 (1), 23–38. doi:10.1080/14781159808412845.
Gill, S., 2012. Introduction: global crises and the crisis of global leadership. In:
S. Gill, ed. Global crises and the crisis of global leadership. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1–20.
18 T. R. EIMER AND T. BARTELS
Gill, S. and Cutler, C., 2014. New constitutionalism and world order: general
introduction. In: S. Gill and C. Cutler, eds.. New constitutionalism and world
order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–22.
Görg, C., 2003. Post-Fordist societal relationships with nature: the Role of NGOs and
the state in biodiversity politics. Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics,
Culture and Society, 15 (2), 263–288. doi:10.1080/0893569032000113569.
Götting, H.-P., 2004. Biodiversität und Patentrecht. GRURInt, 9, 731–736.
Hanna, P. and Vanclay, F., 2013. Human rights, indigenous peoples and the
concept of free, prior and informed consent. Impact Assessment and Project
Appraisal, 31 (2), 146–157. doi:10.1080/14615517.2013.780373.
Hansen, T., 2015. Global climate agreement passes over issues critical to indigenous
peoples’ caucus. Available from: https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/
environment/global-climate-agreement-passes-over-issues-critical-to-indigenous
-peoples-caucus/ [accessed 18 May 2017].
Haugen, H.M., 2016. The right to veto or emphasising adequate decision-making
processes? Clarifying the scope of the Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)
requirement. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 34 (3), 250–273.
doi:10.1177/016934411603400305.
Helfer, L.R., 2003. Human rights and intellectual property: conﬂict or coexistence?
Minnesota Intellectual Property Review, 5 (1), 47–61.
Helfer, L.R., 2004. Regime shifting - The TRIPS agreement and new dynamics of
international intellectual property lawmaking. The Yale Journal of International
Law, 29 (1), 1–83.
Hufty, M., Schulz, T., and Tschopp, M., 2014. The role of Switzerland in the Nagoya
protocol negotiations. In: S. Oberthür and G.K. Rosendal, eds. Access to and
beneﬁt-sharing after the nagoya protocol. London: Routlege, 96–112.
IP Watch, 2013. Available from: https://www.ip-watch.org/2013/04/26/in-great-
shame-wipo-fund-for-indigenous-peoples-participation-running-dry/ [accessed
18 May 2017].
Komai, M., 2015. Vanuatu supports rights of indigenous people sharing their
traditional knowledge to tackle climate change. Available from: https://www.
sprep.org/climate-change/vanuatu-supports-rights-of-indigenous-people-sharing
-their-traditional-knowledge-to-tackle-climate-change [accessed 18 May 2017].
Krasner, S., 1983 [1982]. Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as
intervening variables. In: S. Krasner, ed. International regimes. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1–22.
Krasner, S., 2001. Abiding sovereignity. International Political Science Review, 22
(3), 229–251. doi:10.1177/0192512101223002.
Kumar-Rao, A., 2016. How the Paris agreement lost its soul. Available from: http://
www.ﬁcusmedia.com/2016/01/05/how-the-paris-agreement-lost-its-soul/
[accessed 19 May 2017].
Kuyper, J.W., 2014. Global democratization and international regime complexity.
European Journal of International Relations, 20 (3), 620–646. doi:10.1177/
1354066113497492.
Lake, D.A., 2003. The new sovereignty in international relations. International
Studies Review, 5 (3), 303–323. doi:10.1046/j.1079-1760.2003.00503001.x.
Lowenhaupt Tsing, A., 2005. Friction. An etnhography of global connection.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
May, C., 2006. The world intellectual property organization. New Political Economy,
11 (3), 435–445. doi:10.1080/13563460600841140.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 19
May, C. and Sell, S., 2006. Intellectual property rights. a critical history. London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Morin, J.-F., et al., 2017. Boundary organizations in regime complexes: a social
network proﬁle of IPBES. Journal of International Relations and Development, 20
(3), 543–577. doi:10.1057/s41268-016-0006-8.
Morin, J.-F. and Orsini, A. (2011). Linking regime complexity to policy coherency:
the case of genetic resources. GR:EEN Working Paper Series No. 15.
Morin, J.-F. and Orsini, A., 2014. Policy coherency and regime complexes: the case
of genetic resources. Review of International Studies, 40 (2), 303–324.
doi:10.1017/S0260210513000168.
Nagendra, H. and Ostrom, E., 2012. Polycentric governance of multifunctional
forested landscapes. International Journal of the Commons, 6 (2), 104–133.
doi:10.18352/ijc.321.
Narula, M., 2014. Impact of Indian patent law on traditional knowledge.
International Journal of Advanced Research in Management and Social Sciences,
3 (6), 40–58.
Nel, A., 2017. Contested carbon: carbon forestry as a speculatively virtual, falter-
ingly material and disputed territorial assemblage. Geoforum, 81, 144–152.
doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.03.007
Oberthür, S. and Pożarowska, J., 2013. Managing institutional complexity and frag-
mentation: the Nagoya protocol and the global governance of genetic resources.
Global Environmental Politics, 13 (3), 100–118. doi:10.1162/GLEP_a_00185.
Oberthür, S. and Rabitz, F., 2014. On the EU’s performance and leadership in global
environmental governance: the case of the Nagoya protocol. Journal of European
Public Policy, 21 (1), 39–57. doi:10.1080/13501763.2013.834547.
Orsini, A., Morin, J.-F., and Young, O.R., 2013. Regime complexes: a buzz, a boom,
or a boost for global governance? Global Governance, 19 (1), 27–39.
Rabitz, F., 2018. Regime complexes, critical actors and institutional layering. Journal
of International Relations and Development, 21 (2), 300–321. doi:10.1057/
jird.2016.16.
Raustiala, K. and Victor, D.G., 2004. The regime complex for plant genetic resources.
International Organization, 58 (2), 277–309. doi:10.1017/S0020818304582036.
Redowell, C., 1992. Has the earth been saved? A legal evaluation of the 1992 united
nations conference on environment and development. Environmental Politics, 1
(4), 262–267. doi:10.1080/09644019208414054.
Reimerson, E., 2013. Between nature and culture: exploring space for indigenous
agency in the convention on biological diversity. Environmental Politics, 22 (6),
992–1009. doi:10.1080/09644016.2012.737255.
Rosendal, G.K., 2006. Balancing access and beneﬁt sharing and legal protection
of innovations from bioprospecting: impacts on conservation of biodiversity.
The Journal of Environmental Development, 15 (4), 428–447. doi:10.1177/
1070496506294799.
Rosendal, G.K. and Andresen, S., 2014. Realizing access and beneﬁt sharing from
use of genetic resources between diverging international regimes: the scope for
leadership. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and
Economics, Published Online: 9 December 2014. doi:10.1007/s10784-014-9271-4.
Scharpf, F.W., 1993. Coordination in hierarchies and networks. In: F.W. Scharpf,
ed. Games in hierarchies and networks. Analytical and empirical approaches to the
study of governance institutions. Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 125–166.
20 T. R. EIMER AND T. BARTELS
Sell, S.K., 2010. The rise and rule of a trade-based strategy: historical institutionalism
and the international regulation of intellectual property. Review of International
Political Economy, 17 (4), 762–790. doi:10.1080/09692291003723722.
Shiva, V., 2001. Protect or plunder? Understanding intellectual property rights.
London: Zed.
Spector, B.I., Sjöstetd, G., and Zartman, W., 1994. Negotiating International
Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED). London: Graham & Trotman. doi:10.3168/jds.
S0022-0302(94)77044-2
Straus, J. and Klunker, N.-S., 2007. Harmonisierung des internationalen Patentrechts.
GRURInt, 56 (2), 91–104.
Suiseeya, K.R.M., 2014. Negotiating the Nagoya Protocol: indigenous demands for
justice. Global Environmental Politics, 14 (3), 102–124. doi:10.1162/GLEP_a_00241.
Survival International, 2015. “Annexed”: the rights of indigenous peoples in the UN
climate change conference 2015. Available from: https://www.culturalsurvival.
org/news/annexed-rights-indigenous-peoples-un-climate-change-conference-2015
[accessed 17 May 2017].
Swaminathan, M.S., 1997. Biodiversity: promoting eﬃciency in conservation and
equity in utilisation. In: B. Singh and N. Mahanti, eds. Intellectual property rights
and the tribals. New Delhi: Inter-India Publications, 36–50.
Teran, M.Y., 2016. The Nagoya protocol and indigenous peoples. The International
Indigenous Policy Journal, 7 (2), 6. doi:10.18584/issn.1916-5781.
Teubner, G. and Korth, P., 2009. Zwei Arten des Rechtspluralismus: normenkollisio-
nen in der doppelten Fragmentierung der Weltgesellschaft. In: M. Kötter and G.
F. Schuppert, eds. Normative Pluralität ordnen. Rechtsbegriﬀe, Normenkollisionen
und Rule of Law in Kontexten dies- und jenseits des Staates. Baden Baden: Nomos,
137–168.
Thompson, M.C., Baruah, M., and Carr, E.R., 2011. Seeing REDD+ as a project of
environmental governance by environmental sciences. Environmental Science
Policy, 14 (2), 100–110. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2010.11.006.
Tobin, B. and Swiderska, K. (2001). En busca de un lenguaje común: participación
indígena en el desarrollo de un régimen sui generis para la protección del con-
ocimiento tradicional en el Perú (No. 2). IIED.
Tobin, B.M., 2014. Indigenous peoples, customary law and human rights - why living
law matters. Oxon: Earthscan.
UNFCCC, 2014. United nations framework convention on climate change (2014):
admitted NGO Available from: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/ngo/
items/9411.php [accessed 11 November 2016].
UN-REDD, 2013. UN REDD guidelines on fee, prior, and informed consent.
Available from: http://www.uncclearn.org/sites/default/ﬁles/inventory/un-redd
05.pdf [accessed 19 April 2017].
Wallbott, L., 2014. Indigenous peoples in UN REDD+ negotiations:“importing
power” and lobbying for rights through discursive interplay management.
Ecology and Society, 19 (1), 21. doi:10.5751/ES-06111-190121.
Wigger, A. and Buch-Hansen, H., 2014. Explaining (missing) regulatory paradigm
shifts: EU competition regulation in times of economic crisis. New Political
Economy, 19 (1), 113–137. doi:10.1080/13563467.2013.768612.
Witter, R., et al., 2015. Moments of inﬂuence in global environmental governance.
Environmental Politics, 24 (6), 894–912. doi:10.1080/09644016.2015.1060036.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 21
Wold, C., 1993. An Earth parliament for indigenous peoples: investigating alter-
native world governance. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law
and Policy, 4, 197–215.
World Bank, 2016. High-level dialogue on the proposed ESS 7 on indigenous
peoples. Dialogue outcome summary. Available from: https://consultations.world
bank.org/Data/hub/ﬁles/consultation-template/review-and-update-world-bank-
safeguard-policies/fr/meetings/ﬁnal_summary_-_high-level_dialogue_on_ess_7.pdf
[accessed 19 May 2017].
World Bank, 2017. The world bank environmental and social framework. Available
from: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/383011492423734099/pdf/
114278-REVISED-Environmental-and-Social-Framework-Web.pdf [accessed 19
May 2017].
Zelli, F., Gupta, A., and Asselt, H.V., 2013. Institutional interactions at the cross-
roads of trade and environment: the dominance of liberal environmentalism?
Global Governance, 19 (1), 105–118.
22 T. R. EIMER AND T. BARTELS
